Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/97218 
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers No. 499
Publisher: 
Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics (IMW), Bielefeld
Abstract: 
The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single 'aggregate belief system' and (ii) when an individual whose belief system is compatible with several (possibly infinitely many) probability measures wishes to evaluate her options on the basis of a single aggregate prior via classical expected utility theory (a psychologically plausible account of individual decisions). We investigate this problem by first recalling some negative results from preference and judgment aggregation theory which show that the aggregate of several probability measures should not be conceived as the probability measure induced by the aggregate of the corresponding expected-utility preferences. We describe how McConway's (Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 76, no. 374, pp. 410-414, 1981) theory of probabilistic opinion pooling can be generalised to cover the case of the aggregation of infinite profiles of finitely-additive probability measures, too; we prove the existence of aggregation functionals satisfying responsiveness axioms à la McConway plus additional desiderata even for infinite electorates. On the basis of the theory of propositional-attitude aggregation, we argue that this is the most natural aggregation theory for probability measures. Our aggregation functionals for the case of infinite electorates are neither oligarchic nor integral-based and satisfy (at least) a weak anonymity condition. The delicate set-theoretic status of integral-based aggregation functionals for infinite electorates is discussed.
Subjects: 
probabilistic opinion pooling
general aggregation theory
Richard Bradley
multiple priors
Arrow's impossibility theorem
Bayesian epistemology
society of mind
finite anonymity
ultrafilter
measure problem
non-standard analysis
JEL: 
D71
D81
C11
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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