Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96206
Authors: 
Fountas, Ioannis E.
Kampisioulis, Panagiotis K.
Drakatos, Stylianos Th.
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] SPOUDAI - Journal of Economics and Business [ISSN:] 2241-424X [Volume:] 62 [Year:] 2012 [Issue:] 3/4 [Pages:] 16-29
Abstract: 
In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway elections as an example we study the possibility of a required long term coalition in Greece. We potentially suggest which parties could form a coalition by using game theory for those cases, where the choice of one party government is not possible.
Subjects: 
Game theory
N-person game
Characteristic function
Parliamentary coalitions
JEL: 
C
C7
C71
Document Type: 
Article

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