Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/96206 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] SPOUDAI - Journal of Economics and Business [ISSN:] 2241-424X [Volume:] 62 [Issue:] 3/4 [Publisher:] University of Piraeus [Place:] Piraeus [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 16-29
Verlag: 
University of Piraeus, Piraeus
Zusammenfassung: 
In this paper, we present the general contribution of n-person game in turbulent environment of parliamentary coalitions. Same basic data about the coalition form and the characteristic function is necessary in order to connect n-person game theory and behavioral game theory. Taking the Norway elections as an example we study the possibility of a required long term coalition in Greece. We potentially suggest which parties could form a coalition by using game theory for those cases, where the choice of one party government is not possible.
Schlagwörter: 
Game theory
N-person game
Characteristic function
Parliamentary coalitions
JEL: 
C
C7
C71
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
189.11 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.