Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96080
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Mealem, Yosef
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2011-28
Abstract: 
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good comparing two situations: (i) when all players act independently; and (ii) when the players of each group cooperate. This comparison leads us to the conclusion that it is possible for one group to contribute more (and have a higher expected payoff) in the non-cooperative regime than in the cooperative regime.
Subjects: 
contests
rent seeking
public good
easy-riding
JEL: 
D72
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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