Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Epstein, Gil S.
Mealem, Yosef
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2010-19
In a contest group - specific public goods we consider the effect that managing an interest group has on the rent dissipation and the total expected payoffs of the contest. While in the first group, there is a central planner determining its members' expenditure in the contest, in the second group there are two different possibilities: either all the members are governed by a central planner or they aren't. We consider both types of contests: an all pay auction and a Logit contest success function. We show that while governing an interest group decreases free-riding, it may as well decrease the rent dissipation; at the same time the expected payoffs from the groups may also decrease.
Rent dissipation
Central planner
All pay auction
Logit contest success function
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
288.23 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.