Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/96024
Authors: 
Epstein, Gil S.
Mealem, Yosef
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
Working Papers, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics 2009-02
Abstract: 
We consider a two group contest over a group specific public good where each member of a group has a different benefit from the good. Our model can be interpreted in two ways: Each of the players has a non-linear investment cost in the contest, or alternatively, the returns to effort are decreasing as reflected in the contest success function. In the first part of the paper we show conditions under which freeriding decreases and consider the different properties of the equilibrium. In the second part of the paper we develop the properties of the optimal formation of the group and its affect on the equilibrium outcome.
Subjects: 
contests
rent seeking
public good
heterogeneity
free-riding
orchestration of interest groups
JEL: 
D72
C72
H41
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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