Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95948
Authors: 
Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2014
Series/Report no.: 
IWH Discussion Papers 3/2014
Abstract: 
Jurisdictions that engage in inter-regional tax competition usually try to attenuate competitive pressures by substituting salient tax instruments with hidden ones. On this effect, we investigate the efficiency consequences of inter-regional tax competition and fiscal equalization in a federal system when taxpayers fail to optimally react on shrouded attributes of local tax policy. If the statuary tax rate is a relatively salient instrument and taxpayers pay low attention to the quality and the frequency of tax enforcement, the underlying substitution of tax instruments with the aim of reducing the perceived tax price may suppress the under-exploitation of tax bases that is typically triggered by fiscal equalization.
Subjects: 
fiscal equalization
tax salience
tax competition
fiscal federalism
tax-cutcum-base-broadening policy
JEL: 
H77
H22
H30
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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