Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95639
Authors: 
Persson, Petra
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 995
Abstract: 
When a decision-maker's attention is limited, her decisions depend on what she focuses on. This gives interested parties an incentive to manipulate not only the substance of communication but also the decision-maker's attention allocation. This paper models such attention manipulation. In its presence, competitive information supply can reduce the decision-maker's knowledge by causing information overload. Further, a single information provider may deliberately induce information overload to conceal information. These findings, pertinent to consumer protection, suggest a role for rules that restrict communication, mandate not only the content but also the format of disclosure, and regulate product design.
Subjects: 
Communication
Information Overload
Limited Attention
Persuasion
Disclosure
Complexity
Consumer Protection
Salience
JEL: 
D82
D83
D18
M38
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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