Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/95624
Authors: 
Andersson, Ola
Holm, Håkan J.
Tyran, Jean-Robert
Wengström, Erik
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IFN Working Paper 989
Abstract: 
We study risk taking on behalf of others in an experiment on a large random sample. The decision makers in our experiment are facing high-powered incentives to increase the risk on behalf of others through hedged compensation contracts or with tournament incentives. Compared to a baseline condition without such incentives, we find that the decision makers respond strongly to these incentives that result in an increased risk exposure of others. However, we find that the increase in risk taking is mitigated by altruistic preferences and pro-social personality traits.
Subjects: 
Incentives
competition
hedging
risk taking
social preferences
JEL: 
C72
C90
D30
D81
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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