Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/95120 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1998
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IUI Working Paper No. 513
Verlag: 
The Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper proposes an approach for predicting the pattern of mergers when different mergers are feasible. It generalizes the traditional IO approach, employing ideas on coalition-formation from cooperative game theory. The model suggests that in concentrated markets, mergers are conductive to market structures with large industry profits, and thus points to a conflict between private and social incentives. It is shown how mergers may be undertaken in order to preempt other possible, and socially more desirable, mergers. The model also throws light on the formation of research joint ventures and tariff-jumping foreign direct investment.
Schlagwörter: 
Endogenous mergers
coalition formation
JEL: 
L13
L41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.61 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.