Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94683
Authors: 
Vieille, Nicolas
Weibull, Jörgen W.
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
IUI Working Paper 577
Abstract: 
Dynamic decision-making without commitment is usually modelled as a game between the current and future selves of the decision maker. It has been observed that if the time-horizon is infinite, then such games may have multiple subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions. We provide a sufficient condition for uniqueness in a class of such games, namely infinitely repeated decision problems with discounting. The condition is two-fold: the range of possible utility levels in the decision problem should be bounded from below, and the discount factor between successive periods should be non-decreasing over time, a condition met by exponential, quasi-exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
Subjects: 
Game Theory
Time Preference
Hyperbolic Discounting
Repeated Decision Problems
JEL: 
C61
C72
C73
D90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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