Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94176
Authors: 
Schweinzer, Paul
Segev, Ella
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 250
Abstract: 
We show that the optimal prize structure of symmetric n-player Tullock tournaments assigns the entire prize pool to the winner, provided that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium exists. If such an equilibrium fails to exist under the winner-take-all structure, we construct the optimal prize structure which improves existence conditions by dampening efforts. If no such optimal equilibrium exists, no symmetric pure strategy equilibrium induces positive efforts.
Subjects: 
Tournaments
Incentive structures
Rent seeking
JEL: 
C7
D72
J31
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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