Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94149
Autoren: 
Stremitzer, Alexander
Tabbach, Avraham
Datum: 
2009
Reihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 289
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze liability rules in a setting where injurers are potentially insolvent and where negligence standards may deviate from the socially optimal level. We show that proportional liability, which sets the measure of damages equal to the harm multiplied by the probability that it was caused by an injurer's negligence, is preferable to other existing negligence-based rules. Moreover, proportional liability outperforms strict liability if the standard of due care is not set too low. Our analysis also suggests that courts should rely on statistical evidence and bar individualized causal claims that link the harm suffered by a plaintiff to the actions of the defendant. Finally, we provide a result which might be useful to regulators when calculating minimum capital requirements or minimum mandatory insurance for different industries.
Schlagwörter: 
judgment proof problem
uncertain causation
court error and misperception
proportional liability
disgorgement
JEL: 
K13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
474.38 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.