Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/94133 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper No. 334
Verlag: 
Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY), München
Zusammenfassung: 
We study the incentives to share private information ahead of contests, such as markets with promotional competition, procurement contests, or R&D. We consider the cases where firms have (i) independent values and (ii) common values of winning the contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated. With independent values, an industry-wide agreement to share information can arise in equilibrium. Expected effort is lower with than without information sharing. With common values, an industry-wide agreement to share information never arises in equilibrium. Expected effort is higher with than without information sharing.
Schlagwörter: 
information sharing
contest
all-pay auction
JEL: 
D82
D43
D44
L13
D74
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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