Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94128
Authors: 
Strausz, Roland
Sasaki, Dan
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 246
Abstract: 
We develop a model to show that cartels that produce goods with lower durability are easier to sustain implicitly. This observation gen- erates the following results: 1) implicit cartels have an incentive to pro- duce goods with an inefficiently low level of durability; 2) a monopoly or explicit cartel is welfare superior to an implicit cartel; 3) welfare is non-monotonic in the number of firms; 4) a regulator may demand inefficiently high levels of durability to prevent collusion.
Subjects: 
cartels
collusion
durability
JEL: 
L15
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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