Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94104
Authors: 
Mailath, George J.
von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 447
Abstract: 
We provide several generalizations of Mailath's (1987) result that in games of asymmetric information with a continuum of types incentive compatibility plus separation implies differentiability of the informed agent's strategy. The new results extend the theory to classic models in finance such as Leland and Pyle (1977), Glosten (1989), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), that were not previously covered.
Subjects: 
Adverse selection
separation
differentiable strategies
incentive compatibility
JEL: 
C60
C73
D82
D83
G14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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