Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94102
Authors: 
Kesternich, Iris
Schumacher, Heiner
Year of Publication: 
2009
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 280
Abstract: 
We analyze the use of information in a repeated oligopolistic insurance market. To sustain collusion, insurance companies might refrain from changing their pricing schedules even if new information about risks becomes available. We therefore provide an explanation for the existence of unused observables that is information which
Subjects: 
repeated games
insurance markets
oligopoly
unused observables
JEL: 
G22
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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