Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94089
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 185
Abstract: 
We consider antitrust enforcement within the adversarial model used by the United States. We show that, under the adversarial system, the Antitrust Authority may try to prohibit mergers also in those cases in which litigation is inefficient. Even if market concentration and technological disadvantages lead to a significant welfare reduction after merger, from society's perspective the agency's lawsuit may be inefficient. We can show that these inefficiencies may be aggravated if the takeover is hostile.
Subjects: 
hostile takeover
litigation contest
merger
JEL: 
D43
K21
L40
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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