Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94078
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 61
Abstract: 
In this paper a tournament between teams (a collective tournament) is analyzed, where each contestant may spend productive effort in order to increase his team's performance or sabotage the members of the opponent team. It is shown that sabotaging the weaker members of a team always decreases their team's performance more significantly than sabotaging stronger members does. As a consequence, sabotage activities are only directed at a team's weaker members. This finding is quite interesting, as previous results on individual tournaments indicate that oftentimes only the stronger participants should be sabotaged.
Subjects: 
Collective Tournament
Sabotage
Complementarities
JEL: 
C72
J33
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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