Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94031
Authors: 
Höffler, Felix
Schmidt, Klaus M.
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 198
Abstract: 
In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers hut also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are regulated. However, we show that (i) resale may increase prices and make consumers worse off and that (ii) standard retail minus X regulation may increase prices and harm consumers. Our analysis suggests that this is more likely if the number of integrated firms is small, the degree of product differentiation is low, and/or if competition is spatial.
Subjects: 
Resale regulation
wholesale
spatial product differentiation
non-spatial product differentiation
vertical restraints
JEL: 
D43
L11
L42
L51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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