Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/94024
Authors: 
Reisinger, Markus
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 308
Abstract: 
Two-sided market models in which platforms compete via two-part tariffs, i.e. a subscription and a per-transaction fee, are often plagued by a continuum of equilibria. This paper augments existing models by allowing for heterogeneous rading behavior of agents on both sides. We show that this simple method yields a unique equilibrium even in the limit as the heterogeneity vanishes. In case of competitive bottlenecks we find that in this equilibrium platforms benefit from the possibility to price discriminate if per-transaction costs are relatively large. This is the case because two-part tariffs allow platforms to better distribute these costs among the two sides. Under two-sided single-homing price discrimination hurts platforms if per-transaction fees can be negative.
Subjects: 
Two-Sided Markets
Per-Transaction Fee
Subscription Fee
Two-Part
JEL: 
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.