Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93999
Authors: 
Gershkov, Alex
Toxvaerd, Flavio
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 143
Abstract: 
This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction theory.
Subjects: 
Auctions
information disclosure
seller manipulation
buyer credulity
JEL: 
D44
D82
G12
G14
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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