Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93989
Authors: 
Gürtler, Oliver
Harbring, Christine
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 219
Abstract: 
In this paper, we analyze a principal's optimal feedback policy in tournaments. We close a gap in the literature by assuming the principal to be unable to commit to a certain policy at the beginning of the tournament. Our analysis shows that in equilibrium the principal reveals in-termediate information regarding the agents' previous performances if these performances are not too different. Moreover, we investigate a situation where the principal is not able to credi-bly communicate her information. Having presented our formal analysis, we test these results using data from laboratory experiments. The experimental findings provide some support for the model.
Subjects: 
tournament
commitment problems
feedback
experiment
JEL: 
C91
D83
J33
M52
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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