Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93975
Authors: 
Arve, Malin
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 441
Abstract: 
This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency's optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By considering a dynamic setting, both present and future consequences and incentives are taken into account.
Subjects: 
Asymmetric information
Dual sourcing
Favoritism
Financial constraints
Procurement
JEL: 
D82
G30
H57
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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