Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93968
Authors: 
Buccirossi, Paolo
Spagnolo, Giancarlo
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 74
Abstract: 
Forthcoming in the Journal of Public Economics. We study the consequences of leniency - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions, such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is known that leniency helps deterring illegal relationships sustained by repeated interaction. Here we find that - when not properly designed - leniency may simultaneously provide an effective governance mechanism for occasional sequential illegal transactions that would not be feasible in its absence.
Subjects: 
amnesty
corruption
collusion
financial fraud
governance
hold up
hostages
illegal trade
immunity
law enforcement
leniency
organized crime
self-reporting
whistleblowers
JEL: 
K42
K21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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