Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93958
Authors: 
Szalay, Dezsö
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 397
Abstract: 
I study the optimal regulation of a firm producing two goods. The firm has private information about its cost of producing either of the goods. I explore the ways in which the optimal allocation differs from its one dimensional counterpart. With binding constraints in both dimensions, the allocation involves distortions for the most efficient producers and features overproduction for some less efficient types.
JEL: 
D82
L21
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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