Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93951
Authors: 
Szalay, Dezsö
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 386
Abstract: 
I develop new results on uniqueness and comparative statics of equilibria in the Crawford and Sobel (1982) strategic information transmission game. For a class of utility functions, I demonstrate that logconcavity of the density implies uniqueness of equilibria inducing a given number of Receiver actions. I provide comparative statics results with respect to the distribution of types for distributions that are comparable in the likelihood ratio order, implying, e.g., that advice from a better informed Sender induces the Receiver to choose actions that are more spread out.
Subjects: 
strategic information transmission
cheap talk
uniqueness
comparative statics
logconcavity
likelihood ratio order
JEL: 
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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