Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93944
Authors: 
Giebe, Thomas
Schweinzer, Paul
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 352
Abstract: 
We use a simple balanced budget contest to collect taxes on a private good in order to ?nance a pure public good. We show that-with an appropriately chosen structure of winning probabilities-this contest can provide the public good efficiently and without distorting private consumption. We provide extensions to multiple public goods and private taxation sources, asymmetric preferences, and show the mechanism's robustness across these settings.
Subjects: 
Taxation
Contests
Efficiency
JEL: 
C7
D7
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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