Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93918
Authors: 
Cornand, Camille
Heinemann, Frank
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 157
Abstract: 
We propose a speculative attack model in which agents receive multiple public signals. It is characterised by its focus on an informational structure which sets free from the strict separation between public information and private information. Diverse pieces of public information can be taken into account differently by players and are likely to lead to different appreciations ex post. This process defines players' private value. The main result is to show that equilibrium uniqueness depends on two conditions: (i) signals are sufficiently dispersed (ii) private beliefs about the relative precision of these signals sufficiently differ. We derive economic policy implications of such a result.
Subjects: 
Speculative attack
Private value game
Multiple equilibria
Public and private information
JEL: 
F31
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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