Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93866
Authors: 
Dürsch, Peter
Kolb, Albert
Oechssler, Jörg
Schipper, Burkhard C.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 63
Abstract: 
We use an experiment to explore how subjects learn to play against computers which are programmed to follow one of a number of standard learning algorithms. The learning theories are (unbeknown to subjects) a best response process, fictitious play, imitation, reinforcement learning, and a trial & error process. We test whether subjects try to influence those algorithms to their advantage in a forward-looking way (strategic teaching). We find that strategic teaching occurs frequently and that all learning algorithms are subject to exploitation with the notable exception of imitation. The experiment was conducted, both, on the internet and in the usual laboratory setting. We find some systematic differences, which however can be traced to the different incentives structures rather than the experimental environment.
Subjects: 
learning
fictitious play
imitation
reinforcement
trial & error
strategic teaching
Cournot duopoly
experiments
internet
JEL: 
C72
C91
C92
D43
L13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.