Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93812
Authors: 
Krishna, Kala
Tarasov, Alexander
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 407
Abstract: 
This paper identifies a new reason for giving preferences to the disadvantaged using a model of contests. There are two forces at work: the effort effect working against giving preferences and the selection effect working for them. When education is costly and easy to obtain (as in the U.S.), the selection effect dominates. When education is heavily subsidized and limited in supply (as in India), preferences are welfare reducing. The model also shows that unequal treatment of identical agents can be welfare improving, providing insights into when the counterintuitive policy of rationing educational access to some subgroups is welfare improving.
Subjects: 
contests
educational quotas
private benefits
social welfare
JEL: 
D61
I23
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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