Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93759
Authors: 
Kräkel, Matthias
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 200
Abstract: 
We analyze the optimal choice of risk in a two-stage tournament game between two players that have different concave utility functions. At the first stage, both players simultaneously choose risk. At the second stage, both observe overall risk and simultaneously decide on effort or investment. The results show that those two effects which mainly determine risk taking '€” an effort effect and a likelihood effect '€” are strictly interrelated. This finding sharply contrasts with existing results on risk taking in tournament games with symmetric equilibrium efforts where such linkage can never arise. Hence, previous findings based on symmetry at the effort stage turn out to be nongeneric.
Subjects: 
asymmetric equilibria
rank-order tournaments
risk taking
JEL: 
C72
J3
L1
M5
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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