Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93745
Authors: 
Hu, Luke
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper 377
Abstract: 
This paper considers procurement auctions with costly bidding when the auctioneer is unable to commit himself to restrict the number of bidders. The auctioneer can, however, offer a financial reward to be paid to every short-listed bidders as an indirect commitment device. Rewards for short-listed bidders are costly. Nevertheless, it is generally optimal for the procurer to credibly implement the same restriction of the number of bidders that is optimal under full commitment.
Subjects: 
Procurement
auctions
industrial organization
mechanism design
JEL: 
D21
D43
D44
D45
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.