Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/93570
Autoren: 
Fabella, Raul V.
Datum: 
2013
Reihe/Nr.: 
UPSE Discussion Paper 2013-09
Zusammenfassung: 
We fuse a social dilemma game and a game pitting the group against nature, where the group's probability of avoiding disaster depends on the resources it raises from members. The result is the Nederlander-Prisoner's Dilemma Game where the cost of failure is equally shared. We introduce the concept of the Ostrom threshold, the failure cost in excess of which cooperation is best reply to itself. We give the condition for the existence of the Ostrom threshold in the Nederlander-Prisoner's Dilemma Game. For high enough cost of failure, cooperation among rational egoists is sustained. The Ostrom threshold first rises and then falls as the fury of nature rises.
Schlagwörter: 
social dilemma
rational egoist
cooperation
Ostrom threshold
JEL: 
C72
D01
D02
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
204.09 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.