Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92888 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 878
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This study constructs a model for examining anticompetitive exclusive supply contracts that prevent an upstream supplier from selling input to a new downstream firm. With regard to the technology to transform the input produced by the supplier, as an entrant becomes increasingly efficient, its input demand can decrease, and thus, the supplier earns smaller profits when socially efficient entry is allowed. Hence, the inefficient incumbent can deter socially efficient entry via exclusive supply contracts, even in the framework of the Chicago School argument where a single seller, a single buyer, and a single entrant exist.
Schlagwörter: 
Antitrust policy
Entry deterrence
Exclusive supply contracts
Transformational technology
JEL: 
L12
L41
L42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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