Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92876
Authors: 
Sakai, Toyotaka
Wakayama, Takuma
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 723
Abstract: 
This paper studies the problem of fairly allocating an amount of a divisible resource when preferences are single-peaked. We characterize the class of envy-free and peak-only rules and show that the class forms a complete lattice with respect to a dominance relation. We also pin down the subclass of strategy-proof rules and show that the subclass also forms a complete lattice. In both cases, the upper bound is the uniform rule, the lower bound is the equal division rule, and any other rule is between the two.
Subjects: 
Uniform rule
Choice of rules
Lattice
Pareto dominance
Singlepeaked preference
Fair allocation
JEL: 
D71
D63
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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