Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92821 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 727
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is securely implementable if and only if it is the no-trade solution, (ii) a neutral solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a serial dictatorship, and (iii) an efficient solution is securely implementable if and only if it is a sequential dictatorship. Furthermore, we provide a complete characterization of securely implementable solutions in the two-agent case.
Schlagwörter: 
Secure implementation
Sequential dictatorship
Strict core
Strategyproofness
Shapley-Scarf housing markets
JEL: 
C72
C78
D61
D63
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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