Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92807
Authors: 
Takamiya, Koji
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 668
Abstract: 
It is known that on some social choice and economic domains, a social choice function is coalition strategy-proof if and only if it is Maskin monotonic (e.g. Muller and Satterthwaite, 1977). This paper studies the foundation of those results. I provide a set of conditions which is sufficient for the equivalence between coalition strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. This generalizes some known results.
Subjects: 
social choice function
coalition strategy-proofness
Maskin monotonicity
JEL: 
C71
C72
D71
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
136.24 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.