Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92759
Authors: 
Ishii, Rieko
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 710
The ISER-Moriguchi Prize Awarded Paper 10
Abstract: 
We examine auction data to determine if bid rigging presents in procurement auctions for paving works in Ibaraki City, Osaka, Japan. We first show that sporadic bidding wars are caused by the participation of potential 'outsiders.' Assuming that the ring is all-inclusive if the auction is not the bidding war, we estimate the scheme by which the ring allocates a win to its members. It is found that the ring tends to select a bidder whose winless period is long and whose winning amount in the past is small relative to other bidders.
Subjects: 
bid rigging
repeated auction
JEL: 
D44
H57
L44
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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