Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/92751
Authors: 
Matsushima, Noriaki
Takauchi, Kazuhiro
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
ISER Discussion Paper, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University 864
Abstract: 
We investigate how port privatization affects port charges, firm profits, and welfare. Our model consists of an international duopoly with two ports and two markets. When the unit transport cost is large, privatization of ports decreases the prices for port usage, although neither government has an incentive to privatize its port. The equilibrium governmental decisions are inconsistent with the desirable outcome if the unit transport cost is not large enough. The smaller country's government is more likely to privatize its port, although the larger country's government is more likely to nationalize its port to protect its domestic market.
Subjects: 
Port
Privatization
Port charge
Oligopoly
Strategic trade policy
JEL: 
L33
F12
R48
F13
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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