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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 672
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider full-truthfulNash implementation, which requires that truth telling by each agent should be a Nash equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism, and that the set of Nash equilibriumoutcomes of the mechanismshould coincide with the f-optimal outcome. We showthat restricted monotonicity together with an auxiliary condition called boundedness is both necessary and sufficient for full-truthful Nash implementation. We also prove that full-truthful Nash implementation is equivalent to secure implementation (Saijo et al. (2005)). This gives us an alternative characterization of securely implementable social choice functions.
Schlagwörter: 
Restricted Monotonicity
Direct Revelation Mechanisms
Nash Implementation
Truthful Implementation
Secure Implementation
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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