Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92608 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ISER Discussion Paper No. 747
Verlag: 
Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER), Osaka
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper analyzes an auction mechanism that excludes overoptimistic bidders inspired by the rules of the procurement auctions adopted by several Japanese local governments. Our theoretical and experimental results suggest that the endogenous exclusion rule reduces the probability of suffering a monetary loss induced by winning the auction, and also mitigates the problem of the winner's curse in the laboratory. However, this protection comes at the price of a lower revenue for the seller.
Schlagwörter: 
common-value auctions
experiments
winner's curse
JEL: 
C91
D44
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
363.99 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.