Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/92385 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2013
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 131
Verlag: 
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
We provide a direct test of the impact of altruism on remittances. From a sample of 105 male migrant workers from Kerala, India working in Qatar, we elicit the propensity to share with others from their responses in a dictator game, and use it as a proxy for altruism. When the entire sample is considered, we find that only migrants' income robustly explains remittances. Altruism does not seem to matter. However, we document a strong positive relationship between altruism and remittances for those migrants that report a loan obligation back home, which is nearly half the sample. We explain the role of loan obligations with a standard remittance model, extended with reference-dependent preferences.
Schlagwörter: 
remittances
altruism
reference-dependent preferences
dictator game
Qatar
JEL: 
O12
O15
D81
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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