Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/90603 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
GlobalFood Discussion Papers No. 7
Verlag: 
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, Research Training Group (RTG) 1666 - GlobalFood, Göttingen
Zusammenfassung: 
We model the economic incentives surrounding opium crop production in Afghanistan. Specifically, we examine the impact of eradication policies when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, and when the crops are produced in sharecropping arrangements. The analysis suggests that when perfect credit markets are available, an increased risk of eradication will lead to less land being allocated to opium poppy. However, when opium is used as a means of obtaining credit, the effects of eradication are no longer clear-cut. Finally, under sharecropping arrangements, increased risk of eradication will make the tenants worse off, while landlords may benefit.
Schlagwörter: 
Eradication
Informal credit markets
Opium
Sharecropping
JEL: 
Q12
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.