Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/90138
Authors: 
van den Berg, Gerard J.
van der Klaauw, Bas
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Paper 7740
Abstract: 
We structurally estimate a novel job search model with endogenous job search effort, job quality dispersion, and effort monitoring, taking into account that monitoring effects may be mitigated by on-the-job search and search channel substitution. The data are from a randomized experiment conducted in the Netherlands. They include registers of post-unemployment outcomes like wages and job mobility, and survey data on measures of search behavior. As such we are the first to study monitoring effects on post-unemployment outcomes. We find that the option to climb the job ladder reduces substitution between search channels during unemployment and compensates for adverse long-run effects of monitoring on wages. We use the structural estimates to compare monitoring to counterfactual policies against moral hazard, like re-employment bonuses and changes in the unemployment benefits path. Replacing monitoring by an overall benefits reduction in a way that is neutral to the worker results in slightly smaller effects with lower administrative costs.
Subjects: 
unemployment duration
search effort
active labor market policy
wage
job duration
job mobility
treatment
search channels
multi-tasking
randomized social experiment
JEL: 
J64
J65
J68
J62
D83
D82
C31
C32
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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