Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89491
Authors: 
Marengo, Luigi
Pasquali, Corrado
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2008/24
Abstract: 
Social choice models usually assume that choice is among exogenously given and non decomposable alternatives. Often, on the contrary, choice is among objects that are constructed by individuals or institutions as complex bundles made of many interdependent components. In this paper we present a model of object construction in majority voting and show that, in general, by appropriate changes of such bundles, different social outcomes may be obtained, depending upon initial conditions and agenda, intransitive cycles and median voter dominance may be made appear or disappear, and that, finally, decidability may be ensured by increasing manipulability or viceversa.
Subjects: 
social choice
object construction power
agenda power
intransitive cycles
median voter theorem
JEL: 
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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