Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89413
Authors: 
Amendola, Gennaro
Marengo, Luigi
Pirino, Davide
Settepanella, Simona
Takemura, Akimichi
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2013/21
Abstract: 
In this paper we develop on a geometric model of social choice among bundles of interdependent elements (objects). Social choice can be seen as a process of search for optima in a complex multi-dimensional space and objects determine a decomposition of such a space into subspaces. We present a series of numerical and probabilistic results which show that such decompositions in objects can greatly increase decidability, as new kind of optima (called local and u-local) are very likely to appear also in cases in which no generalized Condorcet winner exists in the original search space.
Subjects: 
social choice
object construction
hyperplane arrangement
probability
tournament
algorithm
JEL: 
D03
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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