Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89405
Authors: 
Marengo, Luigi
Settepanella, Simona
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
LEM Working Paper Series 2010/02
Abstract: 
We present a geometric model of social choice when the latter takes place among bundles of interdependent elements, that we will call objects. We show that the outcome of the social choice process is highly dependent on the way these bundles are formed. By bundling and unbundling the same set of constituent elements an authority has the power of determine the social outcome. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions under which a social outcome may be a local or global optimum for a set of objects, and we show that, by appropriately redefining the set of objects, intransitive cycles may be broken and the median voter may be turned into a loser.
Subjects: 
social choice
object construction power
agenda power
intransitive cycles
median voter
JEL: 
D03
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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