Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89242
Authors: 
Koster, Maurice
Kurz, Sascha
Lindner, Ines
Napel, Stefan
Year of Publication: 
2013
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper 13-188/II
Abstract: 
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players’ informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i’s prediction value equals the difference between the conditional expectations of v(S) when i cooperates or not. We characterize the prediction value as a special member of the class of (extended) values which satisfy anonymity, linearity and a consistency property. Every n-player binomial semivalue coincides with the PV for a particular family of probability distributions over coalitions. The PV can thus be regarded as a power index in specific cases. Conversely, some semivalues – including the Banzhaf but not the Shapley value – can be interpreted in terms of informational importance.
Subjects: 
influence
voting games
cooperative games
Banzhaf value
Shapley value
JEL: 
C71
D71
D72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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