Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/89158
Authors: 
Aninat, Cristobal
Benavente, Jose Miguel
Briones, Ignacio
Eyzaguirre, Nicolas
Navia, Patricio
Olivari, Jocelyn
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
IDB Working Paper Series IDB-WP-105
Abstract: 
This paper analyzes the political economy of productivity-related policymaking in Chile following a political transaction cost model (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003; Murillo et al., 2008). The main findings indicate that i) the Chilean policymaking process (PMP) was successful in the 1990s in implementing productivityenhancing policies, but as the country moved to a higher stage of development, the PMP grew less adept at generating the more complex set of policies needed to increase productivity at this stage; and ii) the Chilean PMP is less transparent than previously thought (Aninat et al., 2008), thus allowing political actors to favor private interests without being punished by the electorate. This has become apparent as the more sophisticated reforms needed at this stage of development require a deeper and more consolidated democracy.
Subjects: 
Economic policy
Institutional reforms
Productivity
Pensions
Education
Innovation
State modernization
Competitiveness
Chile
JEL: 
L52
O25
O40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.